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FOREWORD
I
THE CANADIAN FEDERALISM SYMPOSIUM
The fundamental text of the Canadian Constitution is the British North
America (BNA) Act through which the Canadian federation was established in
1867. The Fathers of Confederation did not include an amending procedure in
the BNA Act. As an Act of the British Parliament, subject to the normal
provisions for altering legislation, no amending process was thought necessary.
This omission 115 years ago has left Canada as the-only sovereign nation in the
world which must request the assistance of the government of another country in
order to amend its own constitution.
Patriation, "bringing home" the Constitution, has long been the objective of
both the federal and provincial governments. Yet, despite many reconciliation
attempts, the federal and provincial governments have never been able to agree to
an amending formula. This lack of agreement has rendered patriation
unobtainable for over fifty years.
The initial search for a constitutional amending formula in Canada dates back
to the first federal-provincial Constitutional Conference in 1927. In 1931, the
British Parliament recognized the independence of the self-governing countries of
the Commonwealth and officially disclaimed any right to legislate for them
without their consent in the Statute of Westminster. At Canada's express request,
the BNA Act was specifically exempted from the provisions of the Statute of
Westminster. The purpose was to retain the status quo until agreement on
methods of constitutional amendment could be reached in Canada.
The tenth, and most recent, attempt to find an amending formula acceptable
to both federal and provincial governments began with the defeat of the
Progressive Conservative government of Joe Clark in December of 1979. Clark's
government was ousted when he lost a vote of confidence on his proposed budget,
thus obligating new elections. Former Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau was
persuaded to repudiate his decision to retire-announced just a few weeks before-
to head the Liberal party list. In the February 1980 election, Mr. Trudeau and his
fellow Liberals were returned to power in Ottawa. However, the Liberals failed to
win a seat west of Winnipeg, Manitoba-the geographical center of the country.
The natural western alienation that followed from the election of this "eastern"
government helped set the stage for the present constitutional confrontation.
Prime Minister Trudeau has long been interested in codifying the Canadian
Constitution and entrenching a Charter of Rights and Freedoms within the
Constitution. At the Victoria Conference called by Trudeau in June of 1971, all
first ministers of the ten provinces reached agreement on an amending formula.
However, when the Government of Quebec decided not to proceed with the full
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constitutional package after the completion of the conference, the consensus
disintegrated.
In May of 1980, the separatist Parti Qu6b6cois, led by Quebec Premier Ren6
Uvesque brought a referendum to the people of Quebec. Essentially, the
referendum addressed the question whether Quebec should have wide powers to
establish its own relations with foreign nations and levy its own taxes, while
maintaining an economic union with the rest of Canada. Agreement to the
proposal would have begun a process of separation from the other provinces
leading to a new status of "Sovereignty-Association."
The federalists and Prime Minister Trudeau recognized the danger of
Canadian disintegration. Trudeau decisively entered the rhetorical battle for
Quebec in the last months before the vote. He promised the Quebecers a new
status within the federation and a more attractive federal system. His efforts were
rewarded as nearly 60 percent of the voters of Quebec rejected the Parti Queb6cois
proposal.
Prime Minister Trudeau immediately responded to the vote with a call for
renewed efforts to patriate the Constitution and to come to agreement on an
amending process. A meeting of the provincial Premiers was held in June, at
which time it was agreed that the Ministers would continue to meet throughout
the summer. By September, the Committee of Ministers had failed to report any
significant progress toward a compromise. The eleven Ministers then met for six
days of intensive negotiations before admitting failure.
Prime Minister Trudeau reacted to this disappointing setback with an
announcement on national television that the federal government would
relinquish its dream of provincial unanimity and proceed with its own drafts of a
new constitution. Mindful of his party's substantial majority in Parliament,
Trudeau proposed that a reform request be made by both the Senate and the
House of Commons to the Queen. After passage of this Joint Address, the package
was to be presented to the British Parliament for the necessary ratification. In
addition, Trudeau proposed that an extensive, binding, Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, with both language and human rights guarantees, be entrenched in the
Constitution.
Predictably, the provincial response to this "unilateral Constitution-making"
was quick and vehement. Though two provinces--Ontario and New Brunswick-
supported the federal proposal, six provinces immediately challenged the Prime
Minister's package and announced their intention to contest its legality. The
objections to the constitutional patriation package was focused on three distinct
areas: the entrenchment of the Charter with its language rights and civil liberties
gurantees, the control of natural resources, and the amending procedure. The
Quebec government objected to the provisions concerning minority language
rights and mobility guarantees which would allow a Canadian to move anywhere
and work anywhere in Canada. Western provinces-British Columbia, Alberta,
and Manitoba-and Newfoundland were particularly concerned about the
resource ownership provisions of the resolution. These six provinces argued that,
based on the country's origins, history, and regional differences, no amendment to
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the Constitution was feasible without the consultation and approval of the
provinces. The federal government argued that an amending formula which
required unanimity would lead to the stalemate and constitutional stagnation.
A special Parliamentary Committee was established to investigate the
implications of the proposed changes. This Committee met repeatedly from
November 1980 to February 1981 and heard testimony from almost 100 witnesses.
Most of those who appeared before the Committee advocated a broadening of
individual rights and freedoms through constitutional reform. As a result, the
amendments to the package proposed by the Committee extended the scope and
protections in the Charter.
The provinces opposed to the patriation package countered the federal
government's plans to dispatch the proposal to Britain by pressing their legal
argument in three provincial courts. Because provincial governments lack the
authority to take a case directly to the Supreme Court of Canada, the provinces
brought their case to the Manitoba, Newfoundland, and Quebec Courts of
Appeals. This resort to litigation eloquently demonstrates the extent of the
federal-provincial divisions. Both the Manitoba court and the Quebec court
upheld the legality of the federal proposal, holding that there was no requirement
of federal-provincial agreement. The Newfoundland court held that the federal
proposal was illegal. On April 28, 1981, the Supreme Court of Canada decided to
consider the provincial appeal from the Court of Appeals in Manitoba. The
Trudeau government then halted its attempt to speed the proposal to
Westminster, thus sparing the British Parliament the embarrassing specter of eight
Canadian provinces lobbying it to vote against a bill passed by the Canadian
Parliament.
Both sides hoped for a clear victory in the supreme court interpretation of their
grievances. Those hopes were dashed by the supreme court's convoluted decision
on September 28 which satisfied neither side. The court held that, as a matter of
law, agreement of the provinces was not required for amending the Constitution.
However, the court found that the past practice of obtaining the consent of the
provinces when changes in federal-provincial relations and powers were made had
ripened into a constitutional conventzon. Unfortunately, the parameters of the
convention requiring provincial consent were left undefined in the voluminous
opinion.
The ambiguous holding was subject to different interpretations. Prime
Minister Trudeau embraced the decision as his mandate to press forward with his
patriation and constitutional reform package. To those who supported the Prime
Minister, the decision indicated that there were no legal barriers to prohibit the
British Parliament from acting on their resolution. Opponents of Trudeau's
package relied on the proposition that the government's proposal, while not
technically illegal, contravened long-established customs and practices in Canada.
In short, the supreme court decision had the effect of moving the constitutional
debate back into the political arena.
The court's decision gave no guidance on the question of how many provinces
the federal government had to enlist to meet conventional standards. The
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unexpected ambiguity of the holding caused all parties to the debate to reevaluate
their positions to determine just how far they were willing to go in the game of
"constitutional chicken." While none of the rejectionist provinces wanted to break
rank and submit to the federal government's proposal, none wanted to be left out
of a compromise agreement. Though Trudeau's origional timetable called for the
submission of his proposal shortly after the Canadian Parliament reconvened on
October 14, the prospect of a national consensus prompted the Prime Minister to
accede to the demands from the provincial Premiers not to proceed immediately.
The delay gave the provincial leaders time to meet together in Montreal to
prepare for one final negotiating session with Trudeau.
On November 2, Trudeau and the ten provincial Premiers met in Ottawa and
began a series of closed sessions characterized by hard bargaining and compromise.
Ninety hours later, the consensus between the federal government and nine of the
ten provinces was announced. Though Trudeau had made significant concessions
from his origional position, Ren6 Lvesque of Quebec was unwilling to agree to
the final package.
To reach the consensus, Trudeau was forced to accept a divisive amending
procedure and a reduced and qualified Charter. The agreement included an
amending process which would give each province the authority to enact
legislation "notwithstanding" the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Uvesque
refused to join the agreement without a guarantee of compensation if the
nonapplication-provincial "opting out"-included financial cost. Trudeau's
nightmare scenario was the prospect of a "checkerboard Canada" with
geographical boundaries defining the extent and breadth of rights and obligations.
In return for federal compromises, the nine anglophone premiers agreed to give
Trudeau his cherished minority education provisions in the Charter. Lvesque,
however, would not compromise his position on this provision.
The Italian political theorist Machiavelli said "[tjhere is nothing more difficult
to arrange, more doubtful of success, and more dangerous" than initiating changes
in a nation's constitution. The consensus reached in Ottawa raised several
potential problems. Minority groups and civil rights activists have already
expressed their disapproval of the provision that allows the provinces to choose not
to participate in constitutional rights which would otherwise be guaranteed. The
"notwithstanding" clause is an extraordinary grant of power to the provinces.
Prime Minister Trudeau did not rush to implement the Ottawa Agreement in
hopes that further compromises could be made to bring Quebec into the
consensus. The Prime Minister recognized thai Quebec's isolation feeds separatist
sentiment, while bringing the constitutional reform process back to its origional
battleground. When the House of Commons overwhelmingly approved the
reform package in early December, Quebec Premier Lvesque lowered the
provincial flag to half-staff. The inability of the federal government to bring
Quebec into its consensus agreement with the nine anglophone provinces is an
unpleasant reminder of the divisions which remain unresolved in Canada.
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II
THE DUKE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW INSTITUTE
The Canadian Federalism contribution to this issue of Law & Comtemporary
Problems is a product of the Duke International & Comparative Law Institute.
The Institute advances studies in international law and Canadian-American legal
relations at Duke through its publications and conferences. Professor Richard
Leach and the Duke Canadian Studies Program assisted in the formation of the
Institute. With the assistance of Professor Morris Litman, of the Law Center of the
University of Alberta, who was visiting at Duke during 1980-81, the Institute
selected "Canadian Federalism" as the topic for its inaugural publication.
The Institute held a "Conference on Canadian Federalism" on November 8,
1981, at Duke University. Participants in the Conference included Walter S.
Tarnopolsky of the University of Ottawa, J.F. Mallory of McGill University in
Montreal, and W.H. McConnell of the University of Saskatchewan in Saskatoon.
Professor William Van Alstyne commented on Professor Tarnopolsky's paper,
Professor Donald Horowitz addressed the issues in Professor McConnell's
presentation, and Professor Deil Wright of the University of North Carolina
responded to Professor Mallory's article.
The Institute expresses its appreciation for the significant contributions-in
time and energy-of Dick Danner and Claire Germain of the Duke Law Library,
and also to Professor Horace Robertson of the Duke University School of Law.
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